In this paper, we show that news on future technological improvement can trigger an immediate economic expansion in a model with nancial friction on capital allocation. The arrivial of good news on future technology reduces such frictions and generates signi cant increase in current Total Factor Productivity via capital reallocation. This triggers an immediate boom in output, consumption, investment and hours worked. Our empirical evidence using rm-level data supports strongly the above mechanisms for news to a ect current aggregate productivity.
Introduction
More recent evidence shows that the frictions for reallocation of productive capital across rms through merger and acquisition and partial-rm asset sales are countercyclical. For example, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) nd that the correlation of standard deviation of productivity dispersion with output is around -0.4. 2 The convergence of productivity across rms during the boom period indicates that capital reallocation at rm level might play an important role in the aggregate productivity uctuations. Similarly, Maksimovic and Philips (2001) nd that less productive rms tend to be sold as prospects of the aggregate economy improve. This suggests that the frictions impeding reallocation are considerably countercyclical. Furthermore, recent evidence by Harford (2005) shows that the observed relation between economic expansion and capital allocation is essentially driven by an increase in macro-level capital liquidity and reduction in nancial constraint that is correlated with high stock market valuation.
Based on the above observations, we introduce nancial frictions on capital reallocation as our key model ingredient. In our benchmark model, more productive projects are subject to binding nancial constraints on production scale due to the limited enforcement of debt payment by entrepreneurs, while the less productive projects are not. 3 This friction creates a gap of marginal productivity of capital between di erent types of projects, and therefore, the potential e ciency gain of reallocating capital from less productive to more productive projects. The nondefaultness of the debt contract, furthermore, implies that the debt limit and thus production scale of more productive projects is positively linked to their expected lifetime pro ts. The arrival of good news triggers an immediate jump in the lifetime pro t of the more productive projects, and therefore, the value of debt contract for the entrepreneur. As a result, entrepreneurs have less incentive to default the debt payment. This alleviates the friction on capital allocation and induces capital to ow from less productive projects to more productive ones. The capital reallocation reduces gap of marginal productivity of capital across di erent types of projects and pushes distribution of capital towards the rst-best. The e ciency gain thus generated is shown up as an increase in current TFP. 4 We calibrate our model to match the long-run features of U.S. data. Our numerical results show that following an anticipated future technological improvement, the magnitude of the initial increase in TFP, which is purely driven by resource reallocation, is about one third that of the TFP increase when technology improvement is materialized. This e ciency gain leads aggregate output, consumption, investment, and hours worked to comove positively to the initial di erence in productivity between the buying rm and the purchased rm.
together. The business cycle statistics in our model, moreover, are close to the U.S. data.
We then use Compustat and IBES data to test the mechanisms captured in our model for news shocks to a ect current aggregate productivity. In particular, we test the following two theoretical implications: First, news on individual future pro tability a ect current capital allocation for rms that are nancially constrained. In contrast, such news have no e ect on impact on capital allocation of rms that are not nancially constrained. Second, during an economic expansion rms which are nancially constrained acquire more capital than those that are not. In our model, the rst implication serves as the driving mechanism for anticipated technological shocks to a ect capital allocation, while the second is the key for capital allocation to increase aggregate productivity. Our empirical results support strongly both theoretical implications and therefore our story.
Our work is closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2006a) , which show that in a model with nancial frictions due to limited enforcement of debt, mere prospect of high future productivity growth can generate sizable gain in current labor productivity. In their paper, however, nancial frictions are imposed on the investment of new capital goods. This implies that a relaxation of nancial constraint starts to play a role only after the current period output is produced. As a result, when the constraint on investment is relaxed, capital and labor will shift from consumption goods production to investment goods sector, implying that consumption and investment comove negatively. 5 In our model, by contrast, when the nancial constraint on allocating existing capital across plants is relaxed, projects subject to binding nancial constraint will be able to augment capital stock before current production takes place. This makes it feasible for an immediate expansion of current aggregate productivity, and therefore, other macro aggregates simultaneously.
Our paper is also related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the recent discussion on the role of expectation in triggering business cycle. Beaudry and Portier (2006b) show that in a wide class of business cycle models mere changes in expectation about future productivity cannot generate comovement between consumption, investment and hours worked. 6 The reason is simple: without current expansion in output, consumption and investment will always comove negatively if they substitute one to one with each other. One potential source for the observed initial response of TFP to news shocks is simply changes of capital utilization, as argued by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) . However, in the standard setup with convex investment adjustment costs, investment boom must be associated with 5 Beaudry and Portier (2006) have proved that in a two-sector model with constant returns to scale for production, an increase in investment is necessarily associated with a decrease in consumption or hours worked or both. Similar proof can be easily extended to two-sector models with decreasing returns to scale in one or both sectors and nancial frictions on investment goods sector (see, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) .
an increase in marginal q, which in fact implies a decline in capital utilization. 7 Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2006) argue that labor hoarding may translate into additional resources for economic expansion when there is matching friction in labor market. Nonetheless, absent initial productivity increase, either consumption or total investment must decrease in the rst period, as both capital and employment are predetermined in the period that the news shock occurs. 8 Our work di ers from the above studies by exploring the sources of initial expansion in aggregate output in a framework with heterogeneous projects. Both our theoretical and empirical results suggest that capital reallocation is an important channel for news to drive aggregate productivity and business cycles.
Another line of the literature that is closely related to this paper is the role of nancial market frictions in business cycles. It is well documented in the empirical literature that a large fraction of rms are nancially constrained. This observation has invoked many theoretical works, most of which focus on the role of credit market frictions for the propagation of cyclical uctuations driven by TFP shocks (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999 for a literature review). 9 By contrast, this paper explores the role of nancial friction in the transmission of news shocks, and therefore, complements the existing studies on the roles of nancial frictions for business cycles. Finally, this paper is related to the recent work on reallocation as source of TFP (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson, 2003, Barseghyan and Dicecio, 2006) . All these studies, however, focus on the role of reallocation for the cross-country di erence in long-run TFP, instead of its role for TFP uctuations over the business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the roles of news shock on TFP uctuations in a simple model without labor. We then extend the economy to incorporate more realistic features of business cycles in Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion of the calibration procedure and the computation method. In Section 5, we report the impulse responses and business cycle statistics and check the robustness of our model to alternative parameter values. Section 6 tests the mechanisms in our model for anticipated shock to a ect aggregate productivity using rm-level data. Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains the de nition for recursive competitive equilibrium and the derivation of the enforcement constraint. 7 This holds even if there is an expected investment good speci c technological improvement. Only after such a shock is realized, investment and marginal q can move in opposite directions. 8 In addition, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) nd that it is hard to generate expectation-driven business cycles without norminal fricitons and monetary targeting. 9 Another strand of literature focus on the impact of recession on job reallocation. See, among others, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) , Caballero and Hammour (1994) , and Caballero and Hammour (2005).
A model without labor
In this section, we describe a model that abstract from labor as input in production (referred to as \economy without labor") to highlight the role of news shock on TFP and business cycle uctuation via capital reallocation. A full-blown model with richer business cycle ingredients will be provided in the following section.
Consider an economy with a representative household and a continuum of entrepreneurs with unit mass. The representative household owns physical capital and decides how much to consume and how much to invest in physical capital. In addition, the representative household owns the entitlement, and therefore, the pro t of a continuum of projects. The entrepreneur has access to the technology to operate the project. Each entrepreneur operates only one project. At each period, the entrepreneurs decide how much capital and labor to rent from the representative household for pro t maximization of the project. 10 Projects can be classi ed into two categories according to whether working capital (or liquid fund) is needed to pay for the factors of production before production takes place. A fraction of projects, denoted as type-h projects, have to pay for the factors of production with working capital before production takes place. 11 The size of working capital required, denoted as D K h t , increases with the scale of production, where K h t is the capital deployed in a type-h project at period t. For the remaining 1 fraction of projects, denoted as type-l projects, working capital is not necessary.
With probability 1 , projects become unproductive at each period. Once the project is unproductive, a new project with the same productivity type enters the market and starts to be operated by a new entrepreneur. This assumption enables the fraction of each type of projects to be constant over time.
Project Financing and the Entrepreneur's Problem
To nance the working capital, entrepreneurs of type-h projects borrow from the representative household at the beginning of each period and repays the debt at the end of the period after all transactions are completed. 12 Because this is a intra-period load, the net interest payment is zero. The ability to borrow, however, is bounded by the limited enforcement of the debt. At the end of the period, the entrepreneur has the ability to divert the working capital. Once default, the representative household can take over the control right of the project from the entrepreneur and recover a fraction (< 1) of the future project value. The entrepreneur and the representative household can then renegotiate over repayment of the debt. Appendix 8.1 describes in details the renegotiation process and shows that the incentive-compatibility condition imposes the following nancial constraint
where V i t (i = h; l) is the value of type-i project to the entrepreneur at the end of period t:; = is the e ective discount factor is the subjective discount factor: h t+j is the one-period pro t of type-h project at period t + j: (1) implies that the entrepreneur can only borrow a fraction against the future project value.
The production technology of a type-i, i 2 fh; lg, is given by
where K i t are capital and labor employed in a single type-i project. A i t is the productivity associated with project i, which contains two components.
The rst part, i t , refers to the project-speci c productivity. The second part, Z t is an aggregate technological shock. In this section, we keep project-speci c technology i t constant over time and normalized to unity, and assume that aggregate technology Z t is stochastic.
where Z t denotes innovations regarding information on the next period aggregate productivity Z t+1 . Note that the process (3) is di erent from the stochastic technology process in RBC models: new information on Z t+1 arrives at time t; before Z t+1 is realized. As a result, next period productivity is perfectly predictable. In contrast, in the RBC models, shocks occurs at t + 1; the same time when Z t+1 is realized.
At each period, the entrepreneur of a type-h project chooses capital K h t to solve
subject to (1) : 13 13 Alternatively, the entrepreneur's problem can be speci ed as maximizing the present discounted project pro t subject to the sequence of nancial constraints (1) ; by choosing the whole path of capital and labor. The assumption of rental market for capital, however, makes the choice of capital at each period independent of the previous allocated capital. Therefore the dynamic problem boils down to the sequence of one-period pro t-maximization problem, as stated in (4) The problem of an entrepreneur of a type-l project is
which have the rst order condition
Comparing (1) and (6) ; it is immediate that news about A h t+j a ects K h t by changing the tightness of nancial constraint. By contrast, news about A l t+j has no direct impacts on K l t (except through a ecting r t ). We will use rm-level data to test this implication in Section 6.
A Decomposition of TFP
To get some intuition of how the aggregate productivity in this economy is determined, we decompose the aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity, measured as \Solow Residual") as
Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP from its steady state value can be decomposed as
Note the right-hand-side (\RHS" hereafter) of (8) can be further decomposed as
the reallocation e ects
the within-project e ects + cross product terms
The rst argument on the RHS of (9) is referred to as \the reallocation e ect", capturing the e ect of changes in the distribution of capital across projects of di erent types. The second argument is called \the within-project e ects", capturing e ect of the exogenous technological change. Note that even before the aggregate productivity shock is materialized, current T F P could increase in response to good news about future technology through the reallocation e ect. Finally, the representative household's problem is
Timing and Information
At each period, the events proceed as follows. At the beginning of each period, news regarding future technological opportunities arrive. At the same time, current-period aggregate are realized. Then the representative household supplies capital to entrepreneurs. After consumption goods are produced, the household receives factor payments and pro ts, and makes consumption-saving choice. Finally, uncertainty about project survival is revealed.
Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to one calendar year, the frequency adopted by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) in their measurement of the magnitude of capital reallocation. We set = 1; which corresponds to the case of logarithmic utility. is set to be 0:3 to map into a capital income share of 0.3. Also, we set = 0:07 to match the investment capital ratio in the absence of long run growth in both technology and population. = 0:96 to match a steady state real interest rate of 4%. We set the project survival probability to be 0.90, which is broadly consistent with the U.S. data for the manufacturing and business service sector reported by OECD (2001).
For the parameter governing the technology process, we set = 0:95 to match a quarterly persistence of 0.987. We let the standard deviation of innovation Z equal to 1:30% such that the standard deviation of the log of HP detrended TFP simulated from the model (1:25%) is equal to the corresponding value from annual US data.
Finally, and are chosen to target a value of 2 for the ratio of marginal productivity of capital between 75th-and 25th-percentile projects, which is chosen according to the ratio of labor productivity between the 75th-and 25th-percentile plants in an industry's productivity distribution found by Syverson (2004) . 14 This gives = 0:5 and = 0:185:
is speci ed as K h t as a proxy for the production scale or cash ows. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for this economy. 
Impulse Response to News on Z t
To examine how the economy reacts to news about future productivity, we consider the following experiment: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of period 1, all agents receive unanticipated news that the economy-wide productivity Z will increase by one percent in period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is materialized. Our choice of one period as the lag for technological improvement to be realized is motivated by Beaudry and Portier (2006a) , which evidence suggests that a permanent change in TFP may be associated with an up to 10 quarters long period where there may be no actual change in technological opportunities. 15 Figure 1 plots the impulse responses for this economy to the news shock. We see that in response to news on productivity increase at period 2, aggregate output, consumption, and investment all goes up at period 1. 16 Moreover, consistent with Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), 15 The results remain qualitatively the same if we assume that an anticipated shock is realized at period 3.
Our choice of one year as the lag for actual technological improvement to be materialized greatly eases the computation burden to solve for the policy functions.
nancial friction of capital reallocation, as measured by the ratio of marginal productivity of capital between two types of projects is countercyclical.
The reason for the comovement of macro aggregates, as implied by Figure 2 , is that aggregate TFP shifts up in response to the news shock. The decomposition of TFP shows that before actual technology realized, all TFP increase at period 1 is accounted for by the increase in reallocation e ect.
In summary, we show that in a simple model with nancial friction on capital reallocation alone, news on future technological improvement may trigger a reallocation of capital. Such redistribution of capital generates e ciency gain in the current period, shown up as an increase in TFP in aggregate economy. The increase in TFP could then make it feasible for comovement of macro aggregates, before the actual technology shock is realized.
A full-blown model
To compare our model's performance with the data, we now extend the above model to incorporate the following more realistic ingredients: heterogeneity in productive e ciency, nancial friction on resource reallocation (including both capital and labor), convex investment adjustment cost, and endogenous labor supply. We call this economy the \benchmark economy".
We assume that projects are also di erentiated by the expected e ciency of their production technologies. 17 Speci cally, A fraction of projects have higher expected productivity, denoted as type-h or high-tech projects. Similarly, denote the remaining 1 fraction of projects as type-l or low-tech projects. The production technology of a type-i, i 2 fh; lg, is given by
where K i t and H i t are capital and labor employed in a single type-i project. < 1, implying decreasing returns to scale. 18 The magnitude of captures the \span of control" of the entrepreneur, as mentioned by Lucas (1978) . A i t is the productivity associated with project i, which contains three components.
The rst part, (1 + ) t , captures the trend of technology, where is the long-run growth rate of aggregate productivity. The second and the third parts, i t and Z t , respectively, refer to the project-speci c productivity and aggregate technology. As a benchmark, we keep project-speci c productivity i t+1 constant over time and equal to i , with h > l . The speci cation for news shocks on aggregate productivity is the same as that in (3) :
We assume again the operation of a type-h project requires an amount of working capital, which magnitude increases in the production scale. 1920 Entrepreneurs of type-h projects face the same limited enforcement problem of debt repayment as those in the model without labor. For reasons discussed below, the divertible resource is speci ed as
. Similar to the model without labor, the incentivecompatibility condition imposes the following nancial constraint
At each period, the entrepreneur of a type-h project chooses capital K h t ; labor H h t to solve max fK
subject to (13) : The problem of an entrepreneur of a type-l project is max fK
The rst-order conditions of the entrepreneur's problem implies the following allocation of capital between the two types of projects
where h t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nancial constraint (13) . To get the intuition for (15) , note that at the rst best allocation, where the nancial constraint is not binding ( h t = 0), type-h project should be allocated with more capital until the marginal productivity of capital, denoted as M P K; between the two types of projects are the same. Similarly, the allocation of labor follows
Our speci cation of default value gives rise to the following properties: capital-labor ratios in both types of projects are the same, independent of the production scale.
This shuts down the within-project resource misallocation (between capital and labor) as a potential source for productivity gain and allows us to focus on the e ect of resource reallocation between projects on aggregate productivity. Finally, it is easy to shows that given the relative magnitude of production e ciency of these two technologies, the rst best allocation of capital follows
A Decomposition of TFP
We assume the labor income share is correctly measured, that is (1 ) = 1 b : We then decompose the aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity, measured as \Solow Residual") as log T F P t = log
The rst term on the right hand side of (18) is a level e ect: given decreasing returns to scale, larger average scales reduce aggregate productivity. The second term is the sum of the project-speci c technology weighted by the share of capital in each type of project, which we call \adjusted Solow Residual". Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP from its balanced growth path can be decomposed as
where the percentage change of \adjusted Solow Residual" can be further decomposed as
the within-project e ects + cross product term (20) Again, the rst and second arguments on the right-hand-side of (20) are the \reallocation e ect" and the \within-project e ect", which bear similar meanings as their counterparts in the economy without labor. Note that before the aggregate productivity shock is materialized, the change of \adjusted Solow Residual" (and the initial change in aggregate TFP) is purely due to the reallocation e ect.
Household Sector
There is a stand-in household with N t working-age members at date t. The size of the household evolves over time exogenously at a constant rate n = N t =N t 1 1. The household values both consumption and leisure. In addition, investment in capital is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost. In this framework a representative household solves max fct;;Ht;k t+1 g
where c t = C t =N t is per member consumption, h t = H t =N t is the fraction of hours worked per member of the household, H t is total hours worked by all working-age members of the household, and K t is the capital stock owned by the household at the beginning of period t. g y is the growth rate of output per capita at the balanced growth path, which follows 1 + g y = (1 + )
The rst order conditions implies the following standard equations u c (c t ; h t ) w t = u h (c t ; h t ) (24) (24) is the rst order condition for labor. Equation (25) is the rst order condition for investment, and Equation (26) is the standard Euler equation with quadratic adjustment cost.
Finally, we keep the timing and information structures the same as those in the economy without labor.
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of an allocation fc t ; h t g 1 t=0 for the representative household, allocation fK h t ; H h t ; K l t ; H l t ; K t ; H t ; Y t g 1 t=0 for entrepreneurs and price system fw t ; r t g such that Given prices, the allocation solves the household's problem (21) .
Given prices, the allocation solves the entrepreneur's pro t maximization problem (14) .
Capital market clears:
Good market clears:
For numerical simulation, we also de ne the recursive competitive equilibrium in the Appendix. We solve for the decision rules by policy function iterations.
Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model economy using data from the 2005 revision of National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to target the average values of U.S. data over the 1960-2004 period. Our measure of capital stock includes government capital and stock of consumer durables, following Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Again, one period in the model corresponds to one calendar year.
Preference
In our baseline experiment, the period utility of the household follows the utility speci cation in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Ho man (1988) (\GHH" hereafter).
where A t = (1 + g y ) t is incorporated in the utility to ensure the stationarity of hours on the balanced growth path. Under GHH preference, the intertemporal substitution e ect on labor supply is shut down. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) use a preference that nests both the GHH form and that used by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) (\KPR" hereafter), and nd that to achieve comovement between consumption and hours worked, the preference must be very close to the GHH form. We set to 0.4 to match a Frisch elasticity of 2.5. The parameter is set to 1.5 so that the hours worked is 0.31 at the steady state. The discount factor is set to 0.979, implying a steady state real interest rate of 4%. The population growth rate n is set to 0.0147, which is the average growth rate of civilian population aged 16-64 between 1960 and 2004.
Technology
We set g y = 0:0183, which is consistent with the long-run average growth rate of U.S. real GNP per capita. is set to 0:85, the value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) . The parameter is then set so that the labor income share is 0.6. This yields a value of of 0.294. The depreciation rate is set to match an investment capital ratio of 0.074, the average between 1960 and 2004. This gives = 0:04. The adjustment cost parameter, , is set to 2.0, which is close to the estimated result by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) .
We normalize the expected detrended value of technology at low-tech project l to 1:To calibrate h ; the expected productivity of the high-tech projects and , the collateral ratio, we use the fact that at steady state,
Therefore, we set the values of h and simultaneously to match two targets, the ratio of labor productivity between the two types of projects and an aggregate capital-output ratio of 2.5. Typically, the ratio of the labor productivity of the 25 percentile producer to the 75th percentile producer is about 2 (see Bartelman and Doms, 2001 for a survey of the empirical literature and Syverson, 2004, Table 1 .) The fact that in our model economy the number of high-tech projects and low tech projects are set to be equal in our economy, accordingly, implies y h =n h y l =n l = 2: As a result, h = 1:69 and = 0:13: This implies a value of 0.26 for the standard deviation of log i , which is well within the range estimated in the literature. 21 For all other parameters, the calibration procedure follows the calibration in the economy without labor. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters. 
Results
In this section, we rst plot the impulse responses of macro aggregate to news on future technological improvements. We then report the business cycle statistics under the news shocks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results to di erent parameter values.
Impulse Response to News
Our key question is whether news shocks can trigger comovement of output, consumption, investment, and hours. To this end, we study the impulse responses to anticipated future technological improvement. In the baseline case, the economy is subjective to news shocks on aggregate technological improvement. In order to unravel the underlying propagation mechanism, we also study the impulse responses to news shocks on technological improvement speci c to high-tech projects. Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to this news shock. Though the exogenous technology improvement materializes at period 2, the economy starts an expansion at period 1. Consumption, investment, output and hours worked all increases in period 1. As one can see from the rst two column of Table 3 , the e ects of such a news shock are sizable: output, consumption and investment increase by 0:52%, 0:54% and 0:46%, respectively. The change of hours is not signi cant, however. The reason for the comovement of macro aggregates, as mentioned earlier, is the increase in total factor productivity brought by the reallocation of capital from low-tech projects to high-tech projects. This is evident in Figure 4 . Figure 4 depicts the response of capital reallocation, together with the bene t of reallocating capital, measured by the ratio of marginal productivity to capital between the two types of projects.
Impulse Response to News on the Economy-Wide Productivity Z t
The bottom panels of Figure 4 shows that when good news arrive, capital (and labor) is reallocated from low-tech projects to high tech projects. As in the upper right panel, the magnitude of capital reallocation on impact is 0.6 percent of capital stock, somewhat below that is estimated by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) . Accordingly, we see from the upper-left panel that the gap of marginal productivity between the two types of projects decreases. Figure 5 and 6 plot the response of TFP and its components to the good news. In Figure  5 , we see that the level e ect plays a minor role in the change of TFP, especially during the initial periods. The initial response of TFP amounts to 0:43% (Table 3) , which is one third of the magnitude of TFP increase when technology improvement is realized. Figure 6 shows that reallocation e ects explain all the increase in TFP before the shock is materialized. After the technology improvement is realized, the contribution of capital reallocation to TFP starts to decline.
Impulse Response to News on the Project-Speci c Productivity h t
The U.S. boom in the 90s is largely fueled by optimism of a New Economy, represented by technological breakthrough in computer sector and its wide usage in other sectors. Therefore, it is interesting to explore the e ect of news on high-tech project speci c technology, controlling for economy-wide productivity shocks.
Accordingly, we consider news shocks on project-speci c productivity (29) . Speci cally, we let Z t and l t remain constant (equal to their mean) and assume that
where h t denotes information innovations on the next period productivity h t+1 . Here again, we assume that the next period productivity is perfectly predictable: households receive a perfect signal on the future productivity innovation.
We set = :95; the value used in our benchmark case. We then choose h such that the standard deviation of the log of HP detrended TFP simulated from the model (1:25%) is equal to the corresponding value from annual US data. The calibrated h is equal to 2:40%.
The experiment is similar as before: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of period 1, all agents received unanticipated news that h t will increase by one percent from period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is materialized. The results can be seen from Figure 7 to 10.
Although the dynamics looks qualitatively similar, the initial response of macroeconomic variables to such news on project-speci c technological improve is considerably larger than the initial response to news shocks on the economy-wide technology (see the two right columns of Table 3 ). The expectation drives the initial output by 0:72%, more than 2=3 of the output increase to the realized technological shock at period 2. The initial response of TFP is also remarkable: it increases nearly 0:60%. The intuition for the ampli ed e ect of news shock on future A h is straightforward. Given l t unchanged, high-tech projects are more easy to get nanced in future. This implies a larger value of high-tech projects, which relaxes further the nancial constraint and thus induces more resource to ow from low-tech projects to high-tech projects. Hence, capital reallocation in response to news shocks on h (0:87%) turns out to be more active than capital reallocation in response to news shocks on z (0:63%), resulting in a larger e ciency gain as re ected by the response of TFP.
Business Cycle Statistics
We would like to know how our model performs in other dimensions of business cycles. We compare with the U.S. data the business cycle statistics under the above mentioned two di erent speci cations for technological process as in (3) and (29) . To simulate the economy, we rst use the quadrature method described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to construct a three-state Markov chain that approximates the autocorrelation in the AR (1) 
and the supports for the estimated Markov chains of (3) and (29) are equal to f0:031; 0; 0:031g and f0:057; 0; 0:057g, respectively. We then simulate the economy 500 times, each containing 45 periods. The sample mean of the standard deviation of macro variables are reported in Table 4 , together with the U.S. data. We rst examine news shocks on the aggregate productivity Z t . The results are reported in the middle column of Table 4 . Note that the implied standard deviation for the log of output is equal to 2.2%, larger than the corresponding value for U.S. data (1.73%). Di erent from our model, the standard RBC models imply less volatile output than data. This suggests that nancial frictions enhance the propagation of technological shocks, as pointed out by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , among many others. The generated volatilities of consumption and investment have the standard ordering: consumption is less volatile and investment is more volatile relative to output. The volatility of hours implied by the model is almost the same as data.
The results implied by the news shocks to h t is given in the right column of Table 4 . Not surprisingly, the volatilities fall sharply, since low-tech projects are immune of technological shocks. The decline of the volatility of hours is the most remarkable. Recall that wage rate is determined by the marginal labor productivity of low-tech projects. The constant productivity l t thus implies rather stable wage rate and labor supply over business cycles. Table 5 . Cross-Correlation Table  t- The cross correlation matrix is reported in Table 5 . A prominent feature is that under both types of news shocks, all macro variables are highly procyclical, consistent with the stylized facts of U.S. business cycles. Of course, quantitatively, our news shock models overestimate the current correlation coe cients, similar to RBC model. Also interesting is the correlation coe cients between output and TFP. In the U.S. data, TFP leads output by one year. An interpretation of this leading behavior in the RBC model is that output peaks several quarters after the economy is hit by the technology shock, indicating there exist some mechanism that propagate the technology shocks. Though under either shock the model generates a comovement of output and TFP, the one-period leading correlation coe cient for TFP is actually higher than the corresponding one-period lagging correlation coe cient. The reason, as we mentioned before, is that reallocation e ect contributes more to aggregate TFP increase at the initial stages of economic expansion than later on.
Robustness
In our benchmark model with parameter calibrated to U.S. data, news about future rises in Z t+1 or h t+1 triggers an expansion of output, consumption, investment and hours. Moreover, TFP and stock prices also increase before the actual rise in Z t+1 or h t+1 . This is consistent with all empirical aspects of expectation-driven business cycles found in Beaudry and Portier (2006) . In this subsection, we use di erent parameterization to check the robustness. We focus on the adjustment cost coe cient , the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity , since these parameters values are not calibrated but simply borrow from the literature. The possible ranges of parameter values which can generate expectation-driven business cycles are given in Table 6 . For news shock to Z t , the adjustment cost coe cient has to be larger than 0:13, which is lower than the lowest estimate 0:20 in the literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) . Capital adjustment costs help investment to comove with output and consumption with a news shock. To see this, consider a news shock that predicts technological improvement in the future. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution were very large, agents would increase consumption substantially for consumption smoothing, resulting in a decline of investment. However, this would not occur with su ciently large adjustment costs, since otherwise agents would have to pay large adjustment costs for increasing investment as the technological shift materializes.
To have the comovement of consumption and investment, has to fall into the range of (0:11; 1:48) under the benchmark parameterization. If is too small, consumption will decline in the rst period due to the very large intertemporal elasticity of substitution. One the other hand, if is too large, the desire for consumption smoothing is too strong, resulting in the large initial response of consumption to a news shock, which forces investment to decline. This also implies that larger capital adjustment costs tend to relax the upper bound of . In fact, if we raise the adjustment cost coe cient to 5, a value within the range estimated by the literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) , the upper bound of increases to 1:91. The Frisch elasticity turns out to be irrelevant. The conditions for comovement are substantially relaxed when news shocks are projectspeci c. Under benchmark parameterization, business cycles can be triggered by expectations in an economy without capital adjustment costs. The upper bound of also increase to 2:95.
Empirical Evidence
Our theory has the following testable implications: news on individual rm's future profitability can a ect current capital allocation for those that are nancially constrained. In contrast, such news have no e ect on impact on capital allocation for those that are not nancially constrained, since the capital deployed in those rms can only be a ected by the current level of productivity: This section provides evidence supporting the prediction, and thus the fundamental mechanism in our model for news shocks to a ect capital allocation.
Data
One of the major di culties in testing the rst prediction is how to distinguish rms that are nancially constrained. We use an index constructed by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001), which is based on work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , to measure the likelihood of a rm to be nancial constrained. Denote it as KZ index.
KZ is a weighted average of a rm-year's cash ow, cash dividends, cash balances, leverage and rm's average Q, with negative weights on the rst three and positive ones on the last two. These weights are obtained by estimation of ordered logit models of the probability that a rm falls in one of the ve categories: (1) not nancially constrained; (2) likely not to be nancially constrained; (3) di cult to classify as either constrained or not; (4) likely to be nancially constrained; (5) undoubtedly to be nancially constrained. 22 A higher KZ therefore implies a higher possibility of being nancially constrained. The KZ index has been adapted in some recent empirical work by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) . In particular, Baker et al. (2003) found that the investment of rms with larger KZ is more sensitive in response of Q. We will borrow the empirical strategy of Baker et al. (2003) , with a focus on the impact of expectations on acquisition (rather than the impact of Q on investment).
Expectation data are from the IBES database. IBES asks analysts to provide forecasts of earnings for each rm in the database. There are three variables on expectations; one-and two-year-ahead forecasts for earning per share, and the long-term growth forecast (LT G) representing an expected annual increase in earnings over the next business cycle (a period over the next three to ve years). \When calculating their forecasts of long-term growth, IBES instructs analysts to ignore the current state of the business cycle and to project, instead, the expected trend growth of the company's earnings. Thus, the long-term growth forecasts should contain information not in the one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts, which necessarily will be a ected by current conditions." (Cummins et al., 2006, pp. 799 ) Therefore, the long-term growth forecast (LT G), by the instruction of IBES, is orthogonal to the current state, and thus can be used as a proxy for \news" in our model. We use the mean of LT G across analysts. 23 Firm-level data on capital reallocation and variables used to construct KZ index are from Compustat database. We measure the size of capital reallocation (CR) as acquisition (Compustat Annual Item 129) minus sale of property, plant and equipment (Item 107). Following Baker et al. (2003) , we exclude nancial rms (i.e., rms with a one-digit SIC of six) and rm-years with a book value under $10 million, but includes all observations with data on capital reallocation and KZ index.
The combination of Compustat and IBES databases results in a unbalanced panel which covers the period between 1981 and 2005. 24 The full sample includes 43722 observations, for an average of 1749 observations per year. We use CR i t =A i t 1 as the scaled measure of capital reallocation, where A denotes book assets (Compustat Annual Item 6). To reduce the in uence of outliers, we Winsorize each of the variables used at the rst and ninety-ninth percentile; i.e., we set all variables beyond these tolerances to the rst and ninety-ninth percentile values, respectively. Our results upholds qualitatively without Winsorizing the data. 25 
Empirical Results
We apply the method of Baker et al. (2003) . All rms in the sample data are classi ed into quintiles according to their mean value of KZ i t over the full sample period. 26 For each KZ quintile, we estimate
where a i and a t are rm dummies and year dummies, respectively. Note that LT G i t is by de nition uncorrelated to u i t . The rst hypothesis predicts that the estimated coe cient b should be statistically insigni cant for rms in lower KZ quintiles, while signi cantly positive for rms in higher KZ quintiles. Table 8 presents the results. As predicted by the theory, the estimates of b are not signi cantly di erent from zero for the rst and second quintiles, but positive and highly signi cant for the third to fth quintiles. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between KZ and the e ect of long-term growth forecasts on capital reallocation. The coe cient b rises monotonically from 0:0007 in the third quintile to 0:0015 in the top quintile, suggesting that the rms that are more likely to be nancially constrained have a stronger sensitivity of capital reallocation to long-term expectations than rms that are less likely to be nancially constrained. We use the mean value of KZ i t over the full sample period to measure the likelihood for each rm to be nancially constrained. A key issue is whether the likelihood varies over time. As a robustness check, we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value of KZ i t and run the same panel regression (31) for each KZ quintile. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that our main results uphold. In Column (2), we add a discounted sum of one-and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts to the regression as a control variable. 27 As a further check, we add cash ow over A i t 1 (Compustat Annual Item 14 + Item 18) as an additional control variable in Column (3). The results are essentially the same and the estimates of b for each quintile are rather stable across di erent speci cations. Table 9 . Robustness Check 27 We multiply the one-and two-year-ahead earning forecasts per share by the number of shares outstanding to yield forecasts of future earning levels. We use a discount rate of 0:91, as in Cummins et al. (2006) . However, the results are insensitive to the value of discount rate. Note: and stands for is signi cant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In Column (1), we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value of KZ i t . In Column (2), we add a discounted sum of one-and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts as a control variable.
In Column (3), we further add cash ow over A i t 1 as an additional control variable to the control variable in Column (2). We replace LT G with the long-run real Q in Cummins et al. (1999) .
Finally, we replace LT G with "long-run real Q" constructed by the way proposed in Cummins et al. (2006) . The long-run real Q computes the two-year-ahead expected market value for each rm according to two-year-ahead earning forecasts as well as the long-term growth forecasts LT G. One-year-ahead earning forecasts are excluded since they are most likely a ected by the current state of the economy. Column (4) of Table 9 shows that the estimates of b now become positive and highly signi cant for each quintile. This is not surprising; the estimates of b is biased upwards since two-year-ahead earning forecasts are also likely correlated to u i t . However, there is a strong relationship between KZ and the e ect of expected market value on capital reallocation. The coe cient b rises monotonically from 0:0064 in the bottom quintile to 0:0498 in the top quintile.
Aggregate Implications
The above micro-level empirical nding delivers an important macro-level implication; rms that are nancially constrained acquire more capital in boom periods than rms that are not. The opposite is true for the recessions. 28 Put di erently, we should observe that capital reallocation for rms that are nancially constrained are more volatile along the business cycles. In our model, this macro-level implication is the prerequisite for capital allocation to increase aggregate productivity in boom periods.
We use CR J t 1 N J P i2KZ J CR i t to measure the average size of capital reallocation for rms whose mean value of KZ i t over the full sample period belongs to the J-th quintile, where N J refers to the number of rms in the J-th quintile. Figure  11 that after 1980, while both of d CR 1 t and d CR 5 t are procyclical, capital reallocation for rms in the top KZ quintile is much more volatile than that by rms in the bottom quintile.
[Insert Figure 11 ] t . Due to the sizes of capital reallocation in Compustat, one may suspect that capital reallocation has much smaller e ect on business cycles before 1980. For this concern, we also report results for the subperiod since 1981. The main ndings are still there. This evidence strongly supports the mechanism for capital reallocation to a ect aggregate productivity captured by our model. 
Conclusion
We show that good news on future technological improvement generate an immediate expansion in output, consumption, hours and investment. The key element in our model is nancial friction on allocating capital, which generates a gap of marginal productivity of capital across di erent types of projects. The arrival of goods news on future technology reduces the nancial friction and triggers capital to reallocate from projects that are not nancially constrained to those for which the constraints are binding. This reduces the gap of marginal productivity of capital and pushes the distribution of capital toward the rst best. The e ciency gains created by this reallocation show up in the aggregate economy as an upward shift to current TFP, and lead output, consumption, investment, and hours worked to comove positively.
Furthermore, our empirical evidence based on Compustat data provides direct support for our theory. In particular, we nd that in a broad sample of rms recorded in both Compustat and IBES database, news on individual future pro tability have signi cant impact on current capital allocation of rms that are nancially constrained, while the impact is insigni cant for those that are not nancially constrained. Furthermore, acquisitions by rms that are nancially constrained are more volatile along the business cycles. These ndings strongly support the mechanism captured in our model for news on future technological improvement to a ect current aggregate productivity and other macro aggregates.
Appendix

De nition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for Benchmark Economy
This section sketches out the de nition of the recursive competitive equilibrium for our benchmark economy. To simplify notation we abstract from population and denote lowercase variables as individual variables and upper-case variables as aggregate variables. In our benchmark economy with news shocks, the state variables for the households are s t = Z t ; Z t ; k t ; K t or simply (Z t ; Z t+1 ; k t ; K t ) ; since next period productivity is perfectly predictable by (3) : The household's problem can be rewritten as 
